## Testimony of Chris Stearns Chairman, Seattle Human Rights Commission

# Hearing on the Seattle Human Rights Commission Report and Presentation on Police Reforms

## Before the Committee on Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Seattle City Council

## February 15, 2012

Good afternoon Chairman Harrell and members of the Committee. My name is Chris Stearns and it is my honor to serve as the Chairman of the Seattle Human Rights Commission. The Commission was founded in 1963 to protect and advocate for the human rights and equal treatment of all people who live and work in Seattle. I want to thank you for this opportunity to provide our views on the subject of police reform, and in particular, oversight in the City of Seattle.

While the Commission has testified before the Council's Civil Rights, Energy & Technology Committee, we are pleased to have the new opportunity to discuss human rights and police reform before the Public Safety Committee. We want to especially recognize the Chairman's hard work and leadership on police accountability. On September 15, 2010, you were the first Council Member to hold a hearing in the wake of the John T. Williams shooting and really dig into the issue of police accountability with the public. And you have led the Council and City on the effort to require police officers to wear body-mounted video cameras.

Just this week, KOMO TV news broke the story that a police officer threatened to make up a charge of robbery against two black citizens who were arrested for an assault they did not commit. That threat would never have been discovered had it not been for an audio recording from a dash cam video that KOMO tracked down. By the time of the news report, the Office of Professional Accountability had already investigated and exonerated the officer who made the threat.

It is instances like these that create a deep distrust in the minds and hearts of many Seattle citizens when it comes to the issue of excessive use of force and racially biased policing. The million dollar question is – how can the City's leaders restore that trust?

## **The Commission Report**

In 2011 the Commission undertook an exhaustive review of police accountability practices in cities across the country against the backdrop of several key human rights principles. Those principles are set forth in Appendix A. The Commission issued a report on January 8, 2012 which outlines the Commissions' concerns about effective oversight of policing in Seattle and concludes with three recommendations.

To summarize our report, the Commission recommends that:

- 1. The City Council enact legislation enhancing the powers of the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board to function as an independent appeals panel for the investigation of police misconduct complaints. The enhanced Board should have all of the power and funding necessary to independently and professionally investigate misconduct cases.
- 2. The City should work with the community to being a collaborative agreement to address police reform. The process should include all stakeholders, including police, and should include reforms to improve police service that are not included in the consent decree.
- 3. The City should work with experts to identify and create new baseline standards to measure whether certain aspects of policing (use of force, drug arrests, false arrests, pedestrian stops, gang-related arrests, etc.) result in a disproportionate impact on communities of color within Seattle. The City should use Seattle's Racial Equity Toolkit to further analyze data and improve service.

## **Independent and Effective Oversight**

An independent and effective complaints system is essential for securing and maintaining public trust and confidence in the police, and will serve as fundamental protection against ill-treatment and misconduct. An independent police complaints body should form a pivotal part of such a system.

The Commission understands that police work is inherently difficult and dangerous. Yet failure to adhere to the law and police policies undermines public trust and confidence, lessens cooperation from the community, and inhibits crime prevention. Effective oversight can limit police conduct that violates the law and it can restore public confidence in police practice.

Another essential element of effective oversight is citizen participation. Oversight should offer both police officers and citizens the opportunity to fully present their case. Citizens should have the opportunity to observe and participate in the oversight process and serve on an oversight board, commission, or agency.

If a police complaint system is not fair, the public, the complainants and witness officers, and the city government, all the transparency in the world will not help other than to reveal the worm in the core of the apple. It will not fix the system in and of itself.

### **Human Rights Concerns**

Basic human rights principles require that citizens have the ability to obtain due process and an appropriate remedy when their rights are violated, even if a government official commits the act.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has consistently interpreted due process to require that the person or panel making the final decision over proceedings be impartial in regards to the

matter before them; that parties have access to witnesses and evidence; that the decision process be open to the public and subject to appeal; and that the remedy be commensurate with the offense.

Applying this analysis, human rights law would require the following elements in police oversight:

- 1. An independent, neutral agency or agencies be tasked with oversight and be fully vested with the power to investigate and impose discipline as necessary.
- 2. Police officers and citizens have an equivalent opportunity to be heard they can fully present their respective perspectives to the oversight authority without fear of reprisal, and can appeal an adverse decision to an independent decision-maker; and
- 3. The process is sufficiently transparent to allow the public ample opportunity to observe and participate in the oversight process.

Seattle's current oversight structure does not meet these requirements and should be restructured. Our report identified three major flaws:

- 1. The Police Chief has sole discretion to accept or reject the OPA Director's disciplinary recommendations.
- 2. The OPA Auditor does not have independent authority to review or overturn the Police Chief's disciplinary decisions
- 3. The OPA Review Board does not have the authority to review the evidence the OPA Director relied upon, nor does it have independent authority to overturn the Police Chief's decision.

#### **Recommendations**

As described earlier, the Commission's report identified three recommendations. For purposes of our testimony today, we focus on our first recommendation – the creation of an independent police oversight agency. First let me state that the Commission's report specifically recommends restructuring the Office of Professional Accountability Review Board. We are not wed just to that model. Instead, our recommendations should be read to reflect that the goal of creating an independent and effective oversight entity. It could be OPARB or it could be something else. We have attached a list of other oversight models used by other cities in Attachment B.

We chose OPARB because of the simple fact that it already exists. Under our proposal, the Council could restructure OPARB or create a new body that would have the power to investigate and review police misconduct complaints in a fair, thorough, and impartial manner. It is critical to its success that the oversight entity have sufficient resources and power.

Our recommendation would allow citizens to appeal the outcomes of police misconduct cases. Specifically, a citizen would have the right to appeal the findings of the Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) that are accepted by the Police Chief. We do not believe that all cases should

qualify for appeal but at a minimum, cases for appeal should include use of force, discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and coercion.. The new oversight agency would then have the power to conduct an independent review of the case on a *de novo* basis. Citizens will be notified of this right upon receiving the OPA decision.

The new agency will have the power and sufficient staff resources, including professional investigators, to fully investigate the cases it hears on appeal. That will include subpoena power. The Council should ensure that the Seattle Police Department will be required to cooperate fully with the agency and provide complete, unrestricted and immediate access to records and all information available to the OPA Director.

We believe that civilian insight is extremely valuable, offering new views and insights to the investigative process and the ability to challenge assumptions or biases that may sometimes limit an investigation. We further believe that enhanced civilian involvement will help rebuild community trust in SPD and further improve the overall quality of SPD investigations.

We do not propose at this time limiting or transferring powers of the OPA Director and the OPA Auditor. The OPA Auditor will continue to identify patterns of, or trends in, misconduct, recommend or develop improvements in police policies, procedures, tactics, and training that will serve to increase police integrity and improve the performance of SPD.

#### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, we believe that the creation of a new independent, effective, and citizen-led police oversight agency is a fundamental part of police reform that is necessary in order to restore the public's trust in the Seattle Police Department.

This concludes my testimony at this time.

## Attachment A

## **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**

Signed by United States in 1977 Ratified by United States in 1992

ICCPR	Right	Police Problem	Remedy
Article 6,	Every human being has the	Excessive use of force	Criminal prosecution;
Sec.1	inherent right to life. No one shall		Independent, neutral
	be arbitrarily deprived of life.		police oversight
Article 7,	No one shall be subjected to torture	Excessive use of force	Criminal prosecution;
	or to cruel, inhuman or degrading		Independent, neutral
	treatment or punishment.		police oversight
Article 9,	Everyone has the right to liberty	Excessive use of force	Criminal prosecution;
Sec.1	and security of person. No one		Independent, neutral
	shall be subjected to arbitrary		police oversight
Article	arrest or detention.  Anyone who is arrested or	Excessive use of force	Criminal prosecution;
10, Sec.1	detained must be treated with	LACESSIVE USE OF TOTCE	Independent, neutral
10, 500.1	humanity and respect for their		police oversight
	inherent dignity.		ponce oversight
Article 2,	Anyone whose rights or freedoms	Excessive use of force	Right to fair, prompt,
Sec. 3(a)	are violated shall have an effective	Biased policing	adequate, and
	remedy, even if the violation was	Lack of Police Accountability	independent hearing
	committed a government official.		
Article 2,	An effective remedy means the	Lack of Police Accountability	Right to fair, prompt,
Sec. 3(b)	right to competent judicial,		adequate, and
	administrative or legislative		independent hearing
	authorities, or any other competent		
	authority within the legal system.		
Article 2,	Remedies shall be enforced by	Lack of Police Accountability	Independent, neutral
Sec. 3(c)	competent authorities.		police oversight
Article 2,	The government must "respect and	Excessive use of force	Independent, neutral
Sec. 1	ensure the rights without	Biased policing	police oversight
	distinction of any kind, such as		
	race, color, sex,		
	language, religion"		
Article	Every person is equal before the	Biased policing	Right to fair, prompt,
26	law and is equally entitled to due	Lack of police accountability	adequate, and
	process protections and equal		independent hearing
	protection of the law without		
	discrimination.		

## Attachment B

# **National Police Oversight Models**

City	Board	Membership	Cases Investigated	Independent of Police	Subpoena Power	Disciplinary Power
Dayton	Citizens'	5 members	Citizen appeals of findings	Yes	Yes	No
	Appeals	1 law enforcement	of Dayton Police Dept.'s			
	Board	1 legal	investigation of police			
		3 community members	misconduct claims			
Knoxville	Police	7 members	Appeal of police	Yes	Yes	No
	Advisory and		investigations; may refer			
	Review		cases back to Police for			
	Committee		further investigation; may			
			investigate cases on own.			
Portland	Civilian	9 members	Citizen appeals. Part of the	Yes	No	No
	Review		Indpt Police Review			
	Committee		Division. IPR determines if			
			appeals heard.			
Los Angeles	Office of the	Civilian Inspector	May investigate and review	Yes	Yes	No
	Inspector	General	any police complaints by			
	General		LAPD Internal Affairs.			
Washington,	Office of	5 members	Original complaints of use	Yes	Yes	No
DC	Police		of force, retaliation,			
	Complaints		discrimination, verbal			
			abuse, harassment.			
			Separate from Metro Police			
			Dept. complaint process			
Chicago	Independent	Civilian Chief	investigates use of force,	Yes	Yes	No
	Police	Administrator	police shootings, deaths in			
	Review		custody, domestic			
	Authority		violence, verbal, abuse,			
			bias			